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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A rapidly growing body of evidence suggests that people have positional preferences in the 
sense that they derive utility from their own consumption relative to that of others.
1 
Alongside this development, a corresponding literature dealing with optimal policy responses 
to positional concerns has evolved,
2 showing that such concerns may have a substantial effect 
on the incentive structure underlying public policy. There is also a large literature suggesting 
that various forms of habit formation can explain several empirical patterns that are difficult 
to reconcile with conventional preferences.
3 Yet, all earlier studies on optimal second-best 
policy responses to positional concerns that we are aware of assume that people only make 
“atemporal” consumption comparisons, by valuing their own current consumption relative to 
the current consumption by other people. A much more general approach has recently been 
presented by Rayo and Becker (2007): according to their evolutionary model,
4 selfish genes 
would prefer that the humans they belong to are simultaneously motivated by their own 
current consumption relative to (i) their own past consumption, (ii) other people’s current 
consumption, and (iii) other people’s past consumption. In the macroeconomic literature of 
dynamic consumption behavior, (i) corresponds to what is typically denoted Habit formation 
(sometimes denoted Internal habit formation), (ii) corresponds to Keeping up with the 
                                                 
1  For happiness research evidence, see, e.g., Easterlin (2001), Blanchflower and Oswald (2005), Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2005), and Luttmer (2005). Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) constitute a recent exception in the 
happiness literature, claiming that the role of relative income is overstated. For questionnaire-based approaches, 
see, e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Solnick and Hemenway (2005), and Carlsson et al. (2007). Various 
kinds of physiological and health-related evidence are provided by Marmot (2004); for a more recent example, 
see Daly and Wilson (2009) who found that suicide rates seem to depend on relative concerns. There is also 
recent evidence from brain science, e.g., Fliessbach et al. (2007). 
2 Earlier studies address a variety of issues such as optimal taxation, public good provision, social insurance, 
growth, environmental externalities, and stabilization policy; see, e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Layard 
(1980), Ng (1987), Tuomala (1990), Blomquist (1993), Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 2001), Ireland (2001), Brekke 
and Howarth (2002), Abel (2005), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, forthcoming), and Wendner and 
Goulder (2008). Clark et al. (2008) provide a good overview of both the empirical evidence and economic 
implications of relative consumption concerns; see also Frank (1999, 2005, 2007, 2008) for extensive and 
illuminating informal discussions of relative consumption concerns and how the society should deal with them.  
3This includes various kinds of asset pricing puzzles, such as the equity premium puzzle; see, e.g., Abel (1990), 
Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Chan and Kogan (2003), and Díaz et al. (2003). 
4 See Saad (2007) for a more general treatment of the evolutionary basis for consumer behavior, including 
conspicuous consumption.    3
Joneses, while (iii) corresponds to Catching up with the Joneses (sometimes denoted 
External habit formation).
5 The present paper takes these three types of consumption 
comparisons as a point of departure in a study of optimal income taxation in a dynamic 
economy.  
 
The study of optimal taxation in economies where relative consumption matters for 
individual utility is typically based on static models with linear tax instruments. The present 
paper, in contrast, is based on an overlapping generations (OLG) model, where individuals 
differ in ability and the set of available tax instruments consists of nonlinear taxes on labor 
and capital income. This means that the tax instruments considered here are based on 
informational limitations; not on any other a priori restriction (such as linearity). Therefore, 
our framework enables us to capture that the optimal income tax responses to positional 
concerns may involve purely corrective as well as redistributive elements. Furthermore, a 
dynamic model allows us to explore intertemporal aspects of consumption comparisons as 
well as provides a natural framework for studying capital income taxation. The latter is 
important not least due to the difficulties in explaining the widespread use of capital taxes 
with conventional public economics models. Earlier research shows that relative consumption 
concerns may motivate such taxes (Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, forthcoming), and one 
might perhaps conjecture such concerns to be particularly important when the concept of 
relative consumption has more than one dimension, as we assume here. 
 
Only a few earlier studies deal with optimal nonlinear income taxation in the context of 
positional preferences, and almost all of them have in common that they use static models.
6 
To our knowledge, the only exception is Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (forthcoming), 
who consider optimal income taxation in an OLG model where each consumer exhibits 
positional preferences for consumption in the sense of comparing his/her own current 
consumption with other people’s current consumption both when young and when old. 
However, it is important to emphasize that although their study is based on a dynamic model, 
                                                 
5 This literature rarely analyzes the optimal policy responses related to the externalities induced by relative 
consumption concerns. Ljunqvist and Uhlig (2000) constitute a noteworthy exception. They analyze, in a first 
best representative consumer economy with external shocks, how the externalities due to relative consumption 
concerns call for an optimal tax policy that affects the economy counter-cyclically. Gomez (2006) is another 
example, using a representative consumer model of endogenous growth with external habit formation. 
6 See, e.g., Oswald (1983), Tuomala (1990), Ireland (2001), and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008).   4
the consumption comparisons still remain atemporal in the sense that the measure of 
reference consumption facing each individual solely depends on other people’s current 
consumption, i.e., it is solely based on a Keeping up with the Joneses framework.  
 
The present paper, in constrast, addresses the implications of such atemporal comparisons for 
optimal income taxation simultaneously with the implications of relative consumption 
comparisons over time. These extensions are important. In addition to the empirical evidence 
for between-people comparisons mentioned above, there is evidence suggesting that people 
also make comparisons with their own past consumption (e.g., Loewenstein and Sicherman, 
1991; Frank and Hutchens, 1993). It also makes intuitive sense that old people compare their 
own consumption with several different reference levels, including what they recall about 
their own and others’ consumption when they were young. When growing up, most people 
are also likely to receive information from parents and grandparents about the consumption 
(and other living conditions) characterizing earlier generations. Such comparisons are also 
consistent with the empirical pattern of some financial puzzles such as the equity premium 
puzzle (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) and, as mentioned above, they are in line with 
recent research based on evolutionary models. 
 
Our results show that relative comparisons with one’s own past consumption (Internal habit 
formation) do not directly affect the policy rules for marginal income taxation (although they 
may, of course, influence the levels of marginal income tax rates). The intuition is that such 
comparisons do not generate any externalities. However, positional concerns governed by 
comparisons with other people’s current and past consumption give rise to externalities and 
will, therefore, also directly affect the incentive structure underlying marginal income 
taxation. Specifically, we show that optimal tax responses are associated with two distinct 
motives for public policy: the government wants to (i) internalize positional externalities, and 
(ii) relax the self-selection constraint by exploiting that a potential mimicker may either be 
more or less positional than the mimicked agent. The former mechanism works to increase 
the marginal labor income tax rates, independently of whether individuals compare their own 
current consumption with other people’s current or past consumption (or use a combination 
of these two reference measures). This is so because both types of comparisons imply that 
each individual imposes negative externalities on others; either at present or in the future. We 
also show how the marginal capital income tax structure is governed by differences in   5
positionality over the individual life-cycle, where the relevant measure of reference 
consumption is again based on both the current and past consumption of others. 
 
In general, positional concerns governed by other people’s past consumption give rise to 
much more complex policy responses than comparisons based on other people’s current 
consumption. This is due to the fact that consumption comparisons over time give rise to an 
intertemporal chain reaction with welfare effects in the entire future, whereas comparisons 
with other people’s current consumption only lead to “atemporal externalities.” We can 
nevertheless derive strong results for a natural benchmark case, implying that relative 
consumption comparisons over time (based on the Catching up with the Joneses preferences) 
give rise to the same qualitative marginal labor and capital income tax rate responses as 
comparisons with other people’s current consumption (based on the Keeping up with the 
Joneses preferences). Moreover, we illustrate with a particular Cobb-Douglas functional form 
and show, based on parameter estimates from the literature, that positional preferences of 
both the Keeping up with the Joneses and Catching up with the Joneses types substantially 
increase the optimal marginal labor income tax rates for both ability-types.   
 
The outline of the study is as follows: Section 2 presents the model and the outcome of 
private optimization, while Section 3 presents the optimal tax problem faced by the 
government. The results are presented for the most general formulation of the model in 
Section 4, and for the somewhat more restricted version in Section 5. Section 6 illustrates the 
results based on a Cobb-Douglas functional form, whereas Section 7 summarizes and 
concludes the paper; proofs are presented in the appendix. 
 
2. CONSUMERS, FIRMS, AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
 
We start this section by describing the OLG framework and people’s preferences, followed 
by the definition of some useful measures of the extent to which people care about relative 
consumption. We then present the individual optimality conditions for labor supply and 
savings, followed by the corresponding profit maximization conditions for the firms and the 
condition for market equilibrium. 
  
2.1 The OLG framework and positional preferences 
   6
Consider an OLG model where each individual lives for two periods and works during the 
first but not during the second. Since each individual only works during the first period of 
life, there is no evolution of productivity over time for a single individual, as in Kocherlakota 
(2005), although we allow for technical progress (discussed subsequently) that makes labor 
productivity increase over time. There are two types of individuals in each time period, where 
the low-ability type (type 1) is less productive than the high-ability type (type 2). The number 
of individuals of ability-type i who were born at the beginning of period t is denoted 
i
t n . Each 
individual cares about his/her consumption when young and when old, 
i
t c  and  1
i
t x + , and 
his/her leisure when young, 
i
t z , given by a time endowment, H , less the hours of work, 
i
t l  
(when old, all available time is leisure). For further use, we define the average consumption 
in the economy as a whole in period t as  11 /
ii i i i i
tt t t tt t ii i cn c n xn n −− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑ ∑∑ . 
 
People also care about their own consumption relative to that of others.
7In accordance with 
the bulk of earlier comparable literature, we focus on difference comparisons, where relative 
consumption is defined by the difference between the individual’s own consumption and a 
measure of reference consumption.
8 The appropriate measure of reference consumption at the 
individual level is, of course, an empirical question; yet, as indicated above, there is very 
little information available. Our approach is to follow the recent contribution by Rayo and 
Becker (2007), who argue in the context of an evolutionary model of happiness that the 
reference point of an individual might be determined by three components: (i) other people’s 
current consumption, (ii) his/her own past consumption, and (iii) other people’s past 
                                                 
7 We do not attempt to explain why people care about relative consumption. Therefore, while we share the view 
that signaling of some attractive characteristic constitutes a likely important reason for why people tend to care 
about relative consumption (see, e.g., Ireland, 2001, and also Sobel, forthcoming, for a more general treatment 
of signaling games), we choose to follow the considerably simpler modeling strategy where people’s 
preferences depend directly on relative consumption. We also follow earlier comparable literature in assuming 
that people do not care about their relative leisure; see Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2009) for an analysis 
of the case where also relative leisure matters. 
8 See, e.g., Akerlof (1997), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Bowles and Park (2005), 
and Carlsson et al. (2007). Alternative approaches include ratio comparisons (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; 
Layard, 1980; Abel, 2005; Wendner and Goulder, 2008) and comparisons of ordinal rank (Frank, 1985; Hopkins 
and Kornienko, 2004, 2009). Dupor and Liu (2003) consider a specific flexible functional form that includes the 
difference comparison and ratio comparison approaches as special cases. All of these social comparison models 
belong to the more general class of models with interdependent preferences; cf., e.g., Sobel (2005).    7
consumption. In the context of our model, we interpret these three components such that 
people care about three different kinds of relative consumption: their own current 
consumption relative to (i) the current average consumption when young and when old, i.e., 
i
tt cc −  and  11
i
tt x c ++ − ; (ii) their own consumption one period earlier, i.e.,  1
ii
tt x c + − ; and (iii) the 
average consumption one period earlier when young and when old, i.e.,  1
i
tt cc − −  and  1
i
tt x c + − .
9 
 
The utility function of ability-type i born in the beginning of period t can then be written as 
 
(1) 
11 1 1 1 1
11 1 1 1
11 1
(,, , , , , , )
(,, , , , , )
(,, , ,, )
ii i i i i i i i i i
tt t t t t t t t t t t t t t
iiii i i i i
t t t ttt t tttt t
iiii
tttt t tt
UV c z xcc x cx c ccx c
v c z xcc x cccx c
uczx c cc
++ + + − +
++ + − +
+− +
=− − − − −
=− − − −
=
.    
 
The first line of equation (1) is expressed in terms of the five consumption differences 
described above, as well as in terms of leisure and private consumption when young and 
when old, respectively. However, since 
i
t c  and  1
i
t x +  are decision variables of the individual, 
we can without loss of generality rewrite this utility formulation as the ”reduced form” 
function on the second line, although the partial derivatives will now have a more complex 
interpretation than on the first line. For instance, the partial derivative of  ()
i
t v ⋅  with respect to 
i
t c  reflects both the direct utility effect of increased absolute consumption when young and 
the (presumably negative) utility effect due to lower relative consumption when old 
compared to when young.
10 Therefore, all analytical results derived in a model where 
individuals do not compare their own current and past consumption will continue to hold also 
in the case where people make such comparisons. Intuitively, people will internalize such 
comparisons perfectly.  
 
                                                 
9 Although one can easily imagine that each individual compares himself/herself more with some people than 
with others, we follow the bulk of earlier comparable literature by using the average consumption as a basis for 
the reference points. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (forthcoming) also consider alternative measures of 
reference consumption based on within-generation and upward comparisons, respectively, and find policy 
responses that are qualitatively similar to those that follow if the reference point is based solely on the average 
consumption; yet with a modified interpretation to reflect the type of comparison underlying the analysis. 
10 On the second line, the effect of  1
ii
tt x c + −  on utility is hence embedded in the effects of 
i
t c  and  1
i
t x + .   8
The third line contains the most general utility formulation and resembles a classical 
externality problem. Here, we do not specify anything regarding the structure of the social 
comparisons, beyond that others’ consumption levels cause negative externalities. As will be 
demonstrated, for some results we do not need any stronger assumptions regarding the 
preference structure. Yet, we need the more restrictive utility formulation based on the 
function  ()
i
t v ⋅ , where we specify that people care about additive comparisons, to establish a 
relationship between, on the one hand, the optimal tax policy and, on the other, the degree to 
which the utility gain from higher consumption is associated with increased relative 
consumption. The definition of such measures is the issue to which we turn next. 
 
2.2 The degree of current versus intertemporal consumption positionality 
 
Since much of the subsequent analysis is focused on the relative consumption concerns, it is 
useful to introduce measures of the degree to which such concerns matter for each individual. 
By using 
, ic i












tt t x c ++ Ω =−  as short notations 
for the four differences in the function  ()
i
t v ⋅  in equation (1), we can define the degree of 







































where the subindex indicates partial derivative, i.e.  , ()/
iii
tc t t vvc = ∂⋅∂  and similarly for the 
other terms. The variable 
, ic
t α  can be interpreted as the fraction of the overall utility increase 
from an additional dollar spent when young in period t that is due to the increased 




t α +  has a 
corresponding interpretation when old in period t+1. By analogy, we can define the degree of 
intertemporal consumption positionality when young and when old, respectively, as 












































t β +  reflect the fraction of the overall utility increase from an 
additional dollar spent in period t and t+1 (i.e., when young and when old), respectively, that 
is due to the increased consumption relative to other people’s past consumption. We assume 
that 
,,,,
11 0, , ,1
ic ix ic ix
tttt ααββ ++ <<  for all t.  
 
Let us next define the notions of the average degree of current consumption positionality and 





















− =+ ∈ ∑∑ , 
respectively, where  1 []
ii
tt t i Nn n − =+ ∑ . Note that both  t α  and  t β  are measured among those 
alive in period t. 
 
2.3 The optimal conditions for individuals and firms and market equilibrium 
 
The individual budget constraints are given by 
 
(5a)   ()
ii ii i i
tt t tt t t wl T wl s c −− = ,        
(5b)   11 1 1 (1 ) ( )
ii i
tt t t t t sr s r x ++ + + +− Φ = ,  
    
where 
i
t w  is the before-tax wage rate, implying that 
ii
tt wl  is the before-tax labor income; 
i
t s  is 
savings,  1 t r +  is the market interest rate, and  ( ) t T ⋅  and  1() t+ Φ ⋅  denote the payments of labor 
income and capital income taxes, respectively. Thus, consumption levels when young are 
given by gross labor income net of labor income taxes and savings, whereas consumption   10
levels when old are given by the sum of savings and capital income net of capital income 
taxes.   
 
We assume that each individual treats the average consumption as exogenous. To be more 
specific, and with reference to equation (1) above, this means that ability-type i of generation 
t treats  1 t c − ,  t c , and  1 t c +  as exogenous. The first order conditions for the hours of work and 





ii i i i
tc t t t t tz uw Tw l u ⎡⎤ −− = ⎣⎦ ,        
(7)  
'
,, 1 11 11( ) 0
ii i
tc tx t t t t uu r s r ++ + ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −+ + − Φ = ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ,  
      
in which  , /
ii i
tc t t uu c =∂ ∂ ,  , /
ii i
tz t t uu z =∂ ∂ , and  ,1 /
ii i
tx t t uu x + = ∂∂, while 
'()
ii




tt t sr ++ Φ  
are the marginal labor income tax rate and the marginal capital income tax rate, respectively. 
 
The production sector consists of identical competitive firms producing a homogenous good 
with constant returns to scale; the number of firms is normalized to one for notational 
convenience. The production function is given by 
 
(8)  
12 1 1 2 2 (,, ; ) ( , ; ) tt t t t t F LLKt g L LKt θθ =+ ,  







t l n L =  is the total number of hours of work supplied by ability-type i in period t, 
and  t K  is the capital stock in period t; 
1 θ  and 
2 θ are positive constants. The direct time-
dependency implies that we allow for exogenous technological change. The firm obeys the 


















     for i=1, 2,     
(10)  








.    
        11
Note that equation (9) implies that the relative wage rate between the two ability-types is 
constant both within each period and over time, i.e. 




3. THE SOCIAL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM 
 
In this section, we begin by specifying the social objective function. Then we will 
characterize the self-selection constraint, i.e., that the high-ability type should be prevented 
from mimicking the low-ability type in each period, as well as the overall resource constraint. 
Finally, we form the Lagrangean corresponding to the optimization problem and present the 
associated first order conditions for an interior solution. 
 
We assume that the government faces a general social welfare function as follows: 
     
(11)  
11 22 11 22
00 00 11 11 ( , , , ,....) W W nU nU nU nU = ,  
  
which is increasing in each argument. Since the optimum conditions are expressed for any 




Following the convention in earlier literature on optimal nonlinear taxation, we assume that 
the government is able to observe income, that ability is private information, and that the 
government wants to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type. Therefore, one 
would like to prevent the high-ability type from pretending to be a low-ability type in order to 
gain from the redistribution. The self-selection constraint that may bind then becomes 
 
 (12) 
22 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2
11 1 11 1 ˆ (,, , ,, ) (, , , ,, ) tt t t t t t t t t t t t t t t U u c z xcc c u c H l xcc c U φ +− + +− + =≥ − = ,
  
                                                 
11 This simplifying assumption is made solely for analytical convenience, as endogenous relative wage rates are 
not particularly important for the qualitative results derived below. 
12 A similar formulation is used by Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), although they additionally assume that the 
social welfare function is utilitarian within each generation.   12
where 
12 / tt ww φ =  is the wage ratio, which is a constant by the assumptions made earlier. The 
expression on the right-hand side of the weak inequality in (12) is the utility of the mimicker. 
Although the mimicker enjoys the same consumption as the low-ability type in each period, 
he/she enjoys more leisure (as the mimicker is more productive than the low-ability type).
13 
 
Since ( ) t T ⋅  is a general labor income tax that can be used to implement any desired 
combination of 
1
t l , 
1
t c , 
2
t l , and 
2
t c , given the savings chosen by each ability-type, we will use 
1
t l , 
1
t c , 
2
t l , and 
2
t c , instead of the parameters of the labor income tax function, as direct 
decision variables in the social resource allocation problem. Similarly, the capital income tax, 
1() t+ Φ⋅ , can be used to implement any desired combination of 
1
t c , 
1
1 t x + , 
2
t c , 
2
1 t x + , and  1 t K + , 
given the labor income of each individual. Therefore, instead of deciding upon the parameters 
of the capital income tax function, we formulate the social optimization problem such that 
1
1 t x + , 
2
1 t x + , and  1 t K +  also become direct decision variables.  
 
The resource constraint implies that output in each time period is used solely for private 







(,, ; ) 0
ii i i
tt t t t t tt t
i
FLL Kt K n c n x K −+
=
⎡⎤ +− + − = ⎣⎦ ∑ .    
 
The Lagrangean corresponding to the social optimization problem, with the restrictions given 
by equations (12) and (13), can then be written as 
 
(14) 
11 2211 22 2 2





ˆ ( , , , ,....)




tt t t t t t t t t
ti
Wn U n U n U n U U U




⎡ ⎤ =+ − ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤





.   
 
                                                 
13 Given the set of available policy instruments in our framework, it is possible for the government to control the 
present and future consumption as well as the hours of work of each ability-type (this is discussed more 
thoroughly below). As a consequence, in order to be a mimicker, the high-ability type must mimic the point 
chosen by the low-ability type on each tax function (both the labor income tax and the capital income tax), and 
thus consume the same amount as the low-ability type in both periods.       13
Let 
22 1 1 1
11 1 ˆ (, , , ,, ) tt t t t t t t uu c H l x c c c φ +− + =−  denote the utility of the mimicker based on the third 
utility formulation in equation (1). The direct decision-variables relevant for generation t are 
1
t l , 
1
t c , 
1
1 t x + , 
2
t l , 
2
t c , 
2
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,, 11 ˆ 0
()













,, 11 ˆ 0
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+ −+ = ⎢⎥ ∂∂ ⎣⎦
L
,    
(21)   [ ] 11 10 tt t r γγ ++ +− = ,         
 
where we have used 
12 (,, ; ) i
i
tt t t L wF L L K t =  for i=1,2, and 
12 (,, ; ) tK t t t rF L L K t =  from the first 
order conditions of the firm. For notational convenience, we have written equations (16), 
(17), (19), and (20) such that the right-hand side contains the derivative of the Lagrangean 
with respect to the appropriate measure of reference consumption, i.e., the measure of 
reference consumption that is affected by a change in 
1
t c , 
1
1 t x + , 
2
t c , and 
2
1 t x + , respectively. The 
derivative  / t c ∂∂ L  will be referred to as the positionality effect in period t and will play a 
crucial role in the subsequent analysis of optimal taxation. 
 
                                                 
14 Note that there is a potential time-inconsistency problem involved here since the government may have 
incentives to modify the second period taxation facing each generation once the individuals have revealed their 
true ability-types. Although we acknowledge this potential problem, we follow the bulk of earlier comparable 
literature on optimal nonlinear taxation in dynamic economies by considering a situation where the government 
commits to its tax policy. See Brett and Weymark (2008) for a recent study of (time-consistent) optimal 
nonlinear income taxation without commitment.   14
4. GENERAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, we present the optimal marginal labor income and capital income tax rates 
derived from the model set out above. We start with a general characterization of optimal 
taxation and then examine the positionality effects mentioned above in greater detail. Section 
5 in contrast derives results under a more restrictive formulation where the degrees of 
positionality are constant over time. 
 
4.1 Labor Income Taxation 
 
By defining the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private consumption for 


























we obtain the following expressions for the marginal labor income tax rates by combining 




, '1 1 1 , 2 ,
,, 11 1 ˆ ()
t
zc tt t
tt t z c z c
tt tt t t
MRS



























, ˆ / tt t c t u λ λγ = . If consumption were completely non-positional, i.e.,  /0 t c ∂∂ ≡ L , our 
model would reproduce the marginal labor income tax formulas derived from the 
conventional two-type model (e.g., Stiglitz 1982). In this case, therefore, the marginal labor 
income tax rate of the low-ability type reduces to the first part on the right-hand side of 
equation (22) – which is positive if all individuals share a common utility function – and the 
marginal labor income tax rate of the high-ability type becomes equal to zero. Therefore, the 
terms proportional to the positionality effect in each tax formula summarize how the marginal 
labor income tax structure is modified as a consequence of positional preferences. We can   15
also observe that the terms reflecting positional concerns can simply be added to the term 




4.2 Capital Income Taxation 
 
Let us now turn to the marginal capital income tax rates. We define the marginal rate of 


























respectively. The optimal marginal capital income tax rates in period t+1 are obtained by 
combining equations (7), (16), (17), (19), and (20): 
 
(24)               
2
, ' 1 1, 2, 1,
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LL
.                  
 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (24), which does not directly depend on 
positional concerns, is due to the self-selection constraint and is well understood and 
explained in earlier research (Brett, 1997; Pirttilä and Tuomala, 2001). The final part of each 
tax formula shows how the policy incentives are modified by the relative consumption 
concerns. As the marginal capital income tax rates reflect a desired tradeoff for society 
between present and future consumption, each such term is decomposable into two parts. The 
basic intuition is that each individual generates positional externalities both when young and 
when old. Therefore, whether positional concerns lead to a higher or lower marginal capital 
income tax rate in period t+1 depends on the difference between the positionality effect in 
                                                 
15 Equations (22) and (23) correspond to Equations (17) and (18) in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 
(forthcoming) in a model without intertemporal consumption comparisons. The positionality effect, as 
represented by the derivative  / t c ∂∂ L , takes a different form here, as it reflects both the effect of between-
people comparisons in the same period and the effect of intertemporal consumption comparisons. This will be 
described in more detail below.   16
period t and the discounted positionality effect in period t+1, where the discount factor is 
given by the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption. 
 
Note that the marginal income tax results presented so far rely on the most general 
specification of the utility function, i.e., the function  ( )
i
t u ⋅  in equation (1), meaning that 
equations (22)-(25) hold for all possible functional forms of the social comparisons, as long 
as these comparisons are based on the measures of average consumption described above. To 
be able to say more about the relation between the relative consumption concerns and the 
optimal marginal income tax rates, we must explore the positionality effect in more detail. 
This is the task to which we turn next. 
 
4.3 Exploring the positionality effect 
 
The positionality effect measures the welfare effect of an increase in the reference 
consumption, ceteris paribus. This welfare effect is due to direct consumption comparisons 
between people currently alive, as well as to comparisons with the average consumption in 
the previous period. It also reflects the self-selection constraint in the sense that increased 
reference consumption may affect the incentives to become a mimicker. 
 
For convenience, we denote the difference in the degree of current and intertermporal 
positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type in period t  
22
1, , 2, 1, 2, 1, ˆˆ
ˆˆ
tt t x t t c dx x c c
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respectively, where the symbol “^” denotes “mimicker” (as before), while the superindex “d” 
stands for “difference.” Note that 
d
t α  and 
d
t β reflect positionality differences between the 
young mimicker and the young low-ability type and between the old mimicker and the old 
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we obtain 
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We will refer to equation (26) as the positionality effect in period t. This is clearly a rather 
complex expression based on several mechanisms. Consider the first variable,  t A , which in 
itself encompasses two components. We can interpret  /( 1 ) 0 tt t t N γ αα − −<  as measuring the 
direct welfare loss in period t of an increase in  t c ; the intuition is that an increase in  t c , 
ceteris paribus, leads to lower utility for all consumers via the argument 
i
tt cc −  in the 
function ()
i
t v ⋅  in equation (1). This effect depends on the average degree of current 
positionality without any consideration of positionality differences between the mimicker and 
the low-ability type. The other component,  /( 1 )
d
tt t t N γ αα − , reflects the self-selection 
constraint (in periods t-1 and t) and arises because the mimicker and the low-ability type 
typically differ with respect to the degree of positionality both when young and when old. If 
the low-ability type has a higher degree of current positionality than the mimicker in both 
generations alive in period t (i.e., generations t and t-1), then  0
d
t α < , meaning that increased 
reference consumption gives rise to a greater utility loss for the low-ability type than for the 
mimicker. As such, it becomes more attractive to become a mimicker, implying an additional 
welfare loss. On the other hand, if the mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type 
for both generations alive in period t, increased reference consumption will, instead, 
contribute to relax the self-selection constraint, implying that  0
d
t α > . Although it seems 
intuitively plausible that the direct effect dominates, in which case we have  0 t A < , we cannot 
a priori rule out that a positive self-selection effect may dominate the negative direct effect.  
 
The variable  t B  is analogous to  t A ; yet with the modification that it refers to intertemporal 
rather than current positionality. It also encompasses two distinct components. The term 
111 /(1 ) 0 ttt t N γβ α ++ + −− <  is interpretable as the direct welfare in period t+1 of an increase in 
t c , and the underlying mechanism here is that  t c  affects individual utility negatively via the 
argument  1
i
tt x c + −  in the function  ()
i
t v ⋅ . Again, this is a pure externality that is characterized   18
by the average degree of positionality without any reference to positionality differences 
across agents. The component  111 /(1 )
d
ttt t N γ βα ++ + −  reflects the corresponding welfare effects 
through the self-selection mechanism at time t+1. If the low-ability type has a higher degree 
of intertemporal positionality than the mimicker in both generations alive in period t, then 
1 0
d
t β + < . Therefore, an increase in the reference consumption means a larger utility loss for 
the low-ability type than for the mimicker and, as a consequence, an additional welfare loss. 
If, instead, the mimicker has a higher degree of intertemporal positionality than the low-
ability type, i.e.,  1 0
d
t β + > , then an increase in the reference consumption contributes to relax 
the self-selection constraint, which leads to higher welfare. Again, we cannot a priori rule out 
that a positive self-selection effect may dominate the negative direct effect.  
 
The third part of equation (26) reflects an intertemporal chain reaction. The intuition is that 
the intertemporal aspect of the consumption comparisons, i.e., that other people’s past 
consumption affects utility, means that the welfare effects of changes in the reference 
consumption are not time-separable (as they would be without intertemporal consumption 
comparisons). This is so since a change in the reference consumption today means behavioral 
adjustments in the future, which in turn influence the reference consumption relevant for 
future generations. Finally, note that in the absence of relative comparisons over time, a case 
analyzed by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (forthcoming), the right-hand side of equation 
(26) collapses to  t A . 
 
From equation (26), we obtain the following result regarding the sign of the positionality 
effect: 
 
LEMMA 1. If, from period t and onwards, the low-ability type is at least as positional as the 
mimicker on average, or if the positionality differences are sufficiently small, in any of the 
following senses: 
(i)  
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(ii)  
d
tk tk α α ++ <  and  11
d
tk tk ββ ++ ++ <   0 k ∀ ≥ , 
(iii)  0
d
tk α + ≤  and  1 0
d
tk β ++≤   0 k ∀ ≥ , 
then increased reference consumption in period t reduces the welfare.   19
 
Given the assumption that the individual degrees of positionality (both in the current and 
intertemporal dimensions) are always between zero and one, (i) gives a sufficient condition 
for when increased reference consumption in period t leads to lower welfare. Yet, condition 
(i) is not necessary, since the terms in equation (26) that solely reflect the average degrees of 
positionality (i.e., the pure externality terms) contribute to lower welfare as well. Condition 
(ii) is not necessary either, since  / t c ∂∂ L  can clearly be negative even if (ii) does not hold for 
some  k. Note finally that condition (iii), which we refer to due to its straightforward 
interpretation, is actually redundant since it implies condition (ii).    
 
By combining Lemma 1 with equations (22) and (23), we obtain the following result: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. If any of the conditions in Lemma 1 holds, so that increased reference 
consumption leads to lower welfare, ceteris paribus, then the positionality effect in period t 
contributes to increase the marginal labor income tax rates for both ability-types in period t.  
 
The interpretation of Proposition 1 is straightforward. If the low-ability type is at least as 
positional as the mimicker on average, or if loosely speaking the positionality differences are 
sufficiently small, and given the assumption that the individual degrees of positionality are 
always between zero and one, then we obtain from equation (26) that  /0 t c ∂ ∂< L . 
 
Similarly, by combining Lemma 1 with equations (24) and (25), and then using 
11 1/ tt t nN N ++ +=  to denote the population growth factor in period t+1, we can derive the 
following result for how positional concerns contribute to the marginal capital income tax 
rates: 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that any of the conditions in Lemma 1 holds, so that increased 
reference consumption leads to lower welfare, ceteris paribus. Then, if the preferences 
















,   20
i.e., the positionality effect in period t dominates (is dominated by) the positionality effect in 
period t+1, then the joint contribution of the positionality effects in periods t and t+1 is to 
decrease (increase) the marginal capital income tax rate for ability-type i  in period t+1. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward. If an increase in the average 
consumption (in any period), ceteris paribus, leads to lower welfare, and if the positionality 
effect in period t dominates the corresponding effect in period t+1, there is an incentive for 
the government to discourage the consumption in period t relative to the consumption in 
period  t+1. The opposite policy incentive arises if the positionality effect in period t+1 
dominates. An interesting implication of the proposition is that it would be optimal with 
increasing marginal capital income taxation over time in an economy where the preferences 
become more positional over time (i.e., if we tend to attach a higher value to relative 
consumption increases than to absolute consumption increases as time passes). Such a pattern 
is actually broadly consistent with some empirical evidence: Clark et al. (2008) analyze the 
impact of relative income on happiness and conclude that the concern for relative income tends to 





cx t MRS n + +  as the effective discount factor for ability-type i, which is used 
to discount the positionality effect in period t+1 to period t. 
 
To go further, one would also like to express the marginal income tax rates in terms of the 
degrees of positionality defined in Section 2.2. However, the expressions that can be obtained 
for the general case turn out to be very complex and do not add much to the results derived 
above. In the next section we will, therefore, make some more restrictive assumptions that 
simplify the analysis considerably. 
 
5. FURTHER RESULTS UNDER MORE RESTRICTIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
 
In this section, we consider a special case of the model analyzed above. To be more specific, 
we add the assumptions that the population is constant
16 and that the degrees of positionality 
(the average degrees as well as the indicators of positionality differences between the 
mimicker and the low-ability type) are constant over time in the sense that  t α α = ,  t β β = , 
                                                 
16 This assumption is not necessary for the analysis to hold. The same qualitative results as those derived below 
would also follow with a constant population growth rate, yet at the cost of slightly more notation.    21
dd
t α α = , and 
dd
t β β =  for all t. In addition, to simplify the calculations further (yet with little 
loss of generality), we also add the assumption that the interest rate is fixed and equal to r. 
This implies from equation (21) that  [ ] /1
k
tk t r γγ + =+ . This special case is either 
interpretable in terms of a steady state
17 – provided that a steady state exists – or may follow 
as a consequence of adding additional assumptions about the preferences and technology (see 
below).  
 
Although these assumptions of course reflect a more restrictive model, similar (or stronger) 
assumptions are typically made in the “catching up with the Joneses” literature; see, e.g., 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Díaz et al. (2003). It should also be noted that the model 
is still general enough to reflect different preferences between types, including different 
positionality degrees.   
 
Equation (26) then reduces to a geometric series, such that 
 























where in the last step we have implicitly assumed that  [ ][ ] 01 1 r βα < <− + so that the series 
converges. 
 
5.1 The Time-Inclusive Degree of Consumption Positionality 
 
Let us now aggregate the current and intertemporal degrees of consumption positionality into 




















                                                 
17 This requires that the preferences and technology do not change over time, and that the economy approaches a 
stationary equilibrium in which  i
t l ,  i
t c ,  i
























t ρ  then reflects the fraction of the overall utility increase from an additional 
dollar spent when young in period t that is due to the increased relative consumption 





t ρ +  can be interpreted correspondingly when old in period t+1.  
 
We can then define the average degree of time-inclusive consumption positionality, in present 









Intuitively,  ρ  reflects the overall social loss in a first best world of consuming an additional 
dollar today. The first term, α , reflects the part of this loss that will occur through current 
consumption positionality, whereas the second term,  [ ] 1 r β + , reflects the loss due to 
intertemporal consumption positionality; the reason why the latter loss is discounted is, of 
course, that it will occur in the next period. By analogy, the difference in the time-inclusive 
degree of consumption positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type (also in 












By substituting equations (28) and (29) into equation (27), we have derived the following 
result: 
 
LEMMA 2. If the population is constant, and if  t α α = ,  t β β = , 
dd
t α α = , 
dd
t β β = , and 
t rr =  for all t, then the positionality effect reduces to read 















.      
 
Consequently, the positionality effect can here be written as the sum of two terms. The term 
/( 1 ) 0 t Nγ ρρ −− <  is interpretable as the direct welfare loss of an increase in  t c , and arises 
because a higher  t c  leads to lower utility for all consumers via the arguments 
i
tt cc −  and 
1
i
tt x c + −  in the utility function. In other words, this component is a pure externality and 
depends on the average degree of time-inclusive consumption positionality. The term 
/( 1 )
d
t Nγ ρρ −  captures the differences in the degree of time-inclusive consumption 
positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type (when young and when old). The 
intuition is, of course, that an increase in  t c  may either tighten ( 0
d ρ > ) or relax ( 0
d ρ < ) the 
self-selection constraint. 
 
5.2 Labor Income Taxation 
 
With equation (30) at our disposal, we can relate the marginal income tax rates to the average 
degree of time-inclusive consumption positionality and to differences in this measure of 
positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type. Starting with the marginal labor 
income tax rates, we combine equations (22) and (23) with equation (30). Using the short 
notations 
1
t σ  and 
2
t σ  for the optimal marginal labor income tax rates without relative 
consumption concerns, i.e. 
  
*
11 , 2 ,
,, 11 ˆ tt t





σφ ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ and 
2 0 t σ = , 
we can then rewrite the formulas for the marginal labor income tax rates as follows: 
 
PROPOSITION 3. If the positionality effect is given by equation (30) in Lemma 2, the 
optimal marginal labor income tax rate for each ability-type can be written in the following 
additive form (for i=1, 2): 
 
(31)  
'( ) [1 ] [1 ][1 ]
1
d
ii i i i
tt t t t t d Tw l
ρ
σσ ρ σ ρ
ρ
=+ − − − −
−
. 
     24
To interpret equation (31),
18 note that if the resource allocation were first best (i.e., in the 
absence of any informational asymmetry between the government and the private sector), we 
have 
12 0 ttt λσ σ ===  for all t and  0
d ρ = , hence 
'1 1 '2 2 () ( ) tt t tt t Tw l Tw l ρ = = . In this case, 
therefore, the optimal marginal labor income tax rate is simply an externality-correcting 
Pigouvian tax, i.e., each individual is taxed for the negative positional externality that he/she 
imposes on others. As a consequence, if we were to (erroneously) neglect the positional 
externality generated by the Catching up with the Joneses motive for consumption, we would 
also underestimate this corrective tax. 
 
Returning to our second best economy, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (31) 
is the expression for the marginal labor income tax rate that would follow in the standard 
optimal income tax model without any positional concern. The second term measures the 
marginal external cost of consumption as reflected by the average degree of time-inclusive 
consumption positionality, although its contribution to the marginal labor income tax rates is 
modified compared to the first best formula. The intuition is that the fraction of an income 
increase that is already taxed away does not give rise to positional externalities. Therefore, if 
1 0 t σ >  (as one would expect if all agents have the same utility function; see Stiglitz, 1982), 
this “second best modification” tends to reduce the externality-correcting component in the 
formula for the low-ability type. 
 
The third term on the right-hand side of equation (31) reflects self-selection effects of the 
positional concerns. To provide intuition, suppose first that  0
d ρ > , meaning that the 
mimicker has a higher degree of time-inclusive positionality than the low-ability type. In this 
case, increased reference consumption gives rise to a larger utility loss for the mimicker than 
it does for the low-ability type, and the government may relax the self-selection constraint by 
implementing policies that lead to increased reference consumption. This provides an 
incentive for the government to implement a lower marginal labor income tax rate than it 
would otherwise have done, which means that the third term contributes to decrease the 
                                                 
18 The formulas in Lemma 2 and Proposition 3 take the same general form as equations (16) and (19) in 
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (forthcoming); the difference is that ρ  and 
d ρ  are here based on the time-
inclusive positionality concept introduced above, i.e., that each individual compares his/her consumption with 
both other people’s current consumption and other people’s past consumption.    25
marginal labor income tax rate. Consequently, if 
d ρ  is positive and sufficiently large, then 
this effect may (at least theoretically) dominate the externality-correcting component, 
implying that relative consumption concerns contribute to reduce the marginal labor income 
tax rates. If  0
d ρ < , on the other hand, then increased reference consumption tightens the 
self-selection constraint, meaning that the third term on the right-hand side contributes to 
increase the marginal labor income tax rate. In this case, therefore, the positionality effect as 
a whole leads to increased marginal labor income taxation (see Proposition 1). 
 
5.3 Capital Income Taxation 
 
Turning to the capital income tax structure, we can similarly combine equations (24) and (25) 
with equation (30), and use the short notation 
i
t δ  for the optimal marginal capital income tax 
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⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦  and 
2 0 t δ = . 
We can then derive the following result: 
 
PROPOSITION 4. If the positionality effect is given by equation (30) in Lemma 2, the 




















It can immediately be observed that there is no direct effect of relative consumption concerns 
reflected in equation (32). Intuitively, since the positionality degrees are constant over time, 
the current and future aspects of relative consumption concerns largely cancel out. The 
remaining effect is, however, not necessarily unimportant, and implies that positional 
concerns still modify the marginal capital income tax rate implemented for the low-ability 
type. 
   26
Consider first the situation where 
1, 2,
,, ˆ tt
cx cx MRS MRS > , in which the mimicker values an 
additional dollar today in terms of consumption tomorrow less than does the low-ability type, 
implying that 
1 0 t δ >  and 
'1
11 () 0 tt t sr ++ Φ> . This is so because, if 
1 0 t δ > , we may relax the self-
selection constraint by implementing a positive marginal capital income tax for the low-
ability type. The term 1 ρ −  serves to modify this effect, i.e. to reduce the effect that 
1
t δ  
would otherwise have on the marginal capital income tax rate. The intuition is, of course, that 
capital income taxation leads to an increase in  t c  and, therefore, gives rise to positional 
externalities. This policy incentive is, in turn, either counteracted or further strengthened by 
the component 1
d ρ − , as increased reference consumption may either relax ( 0
d ρ > ) or 
tighten ( 0
d ρ < ) the self-selection constraint. Analogous results and interpretations hold for 
the case where 
1, 2,
,, ˆ tt
cx cx MRS MRS < . 
  
Let us finally relate to a classical result by Ordover and Phelps (1979), regarding when it is 
optimal not to use capital taxation at all. From Proposition 4, it is straightforward to derive 
such conditions also in our model. The following result is an immediate consequence of 
Proposition 4: 
 
COROLLARY 1. If leisure is weakly separable from private consumption in the sense that 
,, , ,
11 1 ((, , , , , ) ,)
i i i i ic ix ic ix i
tt t t ttt tt t Uq f c x z ++ + =Δ Δ Ω Ω  describes the utility function, then both optimal 
marginal capital income tax rates are zero. 
 
This result follows from acknowledging that the mimicker and the low-ability type differ 
only with respect to preferences and use of leisure. Given the separability assumption and 
that the consumers share a common sub-utility function  () t f ⋅ , it follows that 
1, 2,
,, ˆ tt
cx cx MRS MRS = , and hence that the possibility for relaxing the self-selection constraint by 
capital taxation vanishes.  
 
Note finally again that ρ
 
reflects the average degree of time-inclusive consumption 
positionality in present value terms, i.e.,  /(1 ) r ραβ = ++ . Therefore, all qualitative results 
in this section hold in the special case without consumption comparisons over time, i.e., 
where  ρ α = , which is the case addressed by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman   27
(forthcoming). Similarly, all qualitative results hold in the other extreme situation where 
/(1 ) r ρβ =+ , in which there are no comparisons with other people’s current consumption. 
 
 
6. RESULTS BASED ON A COBB-DOUGLAS UTILITY FUNCTION 
 
In order to more clearly illustrate some implications of the relative consumption comparisons 
for optimal income taxation, let us use the same assumptions as in Section 5 with respect to a 
constant population size and interest rate, but in addition consider the following Cobb-
Douglas utility function: 
 
(33)   ,, 1 ()( )( )
ii i
cx z kk k ii i i i
tt n e t t n e t t Uk z c x + =  
 
where  ,,, 0
iiii
zcx kkkk>  are constants and  1
iii
zcx kkk + +< ;  ,
i
net t c  and   ,1
i
net t x +  reflect what we 
may think of as consumption net of relative consumption concerns, when young and when 
old, for an individual of ability-type i born in period t, as defined below:
19 
 
(34a)  [] ,1 1 1' ' '
ii i i i
net t t t t t t t t t ca a c a c c a c c c a c a c − − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =−− + − + − =− − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
(34b)  [] ,1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1' ' '
ii i i i
net t t t t t t t t t x b b xb xc b xcxb cb c ++ + + + + + ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− − + − + − = − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
By substituting equations (34a) and (34b) into equation (33), we obtain: 
 




kk k ii i i i
tt t t tt tt Uk z c a c a c x b c b c −+ + ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− − − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  . 
 
Although the utility functions are allowed to differ between the ability-types, through the 
parameters  ,,
iii
zc kkk , and 
i
x k , the individual degrees of current as well as intertemporal 
consumption positionality are clearly the same between types, and also constant over time.  
                                                 
19 For analytical simplicity, we abstract from the possibility that each individual also compares his/her own 
current consumption with his/her own previous consumption. As mentioned before, allowing for such 
comparisons would not directly affect the optimal tax formulas, since the individuals would internalize these 
effects themselves.   28
The degrees of current consumption positionality when young and when old for each type are 
equal to a and b, respectively, whereas the corresponding degrees of intertemporal 
consumption positionality are given by  ' a  and  ' b .  
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, 
 
where the first expression in brackets thus represents the average current degree of 
consumption positionality and the second the (one period discounted) average intertemporal 
degree of consumption positionality. As before, 
i
t σ  reflects the optimal marginal labor 
income tax rate for ability-type i without relative consumption concerns.  
 
Regarding optimal capital income taxation, it is easy to see that the separability assumption in 
Corollary 1 above is fulfilled by the utility function in Equation (35). Therefore, we know 
that the optimal marginal capital income tax rate is zero for each ability-type and in all time 
periods, irrespective of the parameter values of the utility function. 
 
6.1 Orders of Magnitude 
 
Let us now briefly discuss possible orders of magnitude of the optimal marginal income 
taxes. A couple of studies have attempted to measure the average degree of current 
consumption positionality, corresponding to ( )/2 ab +  in equation (36). According to the 
survey-experimental evidence of Solnick and Hemenway (1998), Johansson-Stenman et al. 
(2002), Alpizar et al. (2005), and Carlsson et al. (2007), the average degree appears to be in 
the order of magnitude of 0.5. Wendner and Goulder (2008) argue, based on the existing 
empirical evidence, for a value between 0.2 and 0.4, whereas evidence from happiness 
studies such as Luttmer (2005) suggests a much larger value in the order of magnitude of 0.8.  
 
There is less direct evidence regarding the average intertemporal degree of consumption 
positionality, corresponding to () '' / 2 ab +  in equation (36). Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004)   29
refer to a benchmark value used by Carrol et al. (1997), with a value of a parameter that can 
be interpreted as an intertemporal degree of consumption positionality equal to 0.5.
20 As a 
sensitivity analysis, they use a value of 0.8, based on Fuhrer (2000). 
 
As an illustrative example, consider the case where the optimal marginal labor income tax 
rate in the absence of relative consumption concerns equals 0.3, and where both the average 
degree of current consumption positionality and the average degree of intertemporal 
consumption positionality are also 0.3, i.e.,  ( ) ( ) /2 ' ' /2 0 . 3
i
t ab ab σ =+ =+ = . Then, if the 
real interest rate between the periods is given by  1 r = ,
21 it follows that the optimal marginal 
labor income tax rate is equal to  [ ]
'( ) 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.3/ 2 0.615
ii
tt t Tw l =+ + = . In other words, the 
optimal marginal labor income tax rate would be above 60%, instead of 30% as in the 
absence of relative consumption comparisons. While the underlying estimates of the current 
and intertermporal degrees of positionality presented above are highly uncertain, and can 
hardly be interpreted as completely independent of each other,
22 it nevertheless seems as if 





The present paper simultaneously recognizes three mechanisms behind relative consumption 
concerns: comparisons with (i) other people’s current consumption (Keeping up with the 
Joneses), (ii) own past consumption (Habit formation), and (iii) other people’s past 
consumption (Catching up with the Joneses). We are not aware of any previous normative 
economic analysis in such a setting. The model here considers optimal nonlinear income 
taxation in an OLG model with asymmetric information between the government and the 
                                                 
20 In Carrol et al. (1997), the reference consumption is not others’ average consumption one period earlier (since 
their study is not based on an OLG model), but a weighted average of others’ average consumption where the 
weight is larger the closer to the present the consumption takes place.  
21 This corresponds to an annual real interest rate of slightly less than 2 percent if we assume 40 years between 
the periods. 
22 We are not aware of any study that simultaneously attempts to estimate the average degree of current and 
intertemporal consumption positionality.   30
private sector, where people compare their own current consumption with the three measures 
of reference consumption mentioned above. 
 
We show that comparisons with one’s own past consumption do not affect the optimal policy 
rules, since such comparisons are internalized by each individual (although the interpretations 
become slightly modified). However, comparisons with other people’s past consumption 
generate positional externalities. In addition, such comparisons give rise to considerably more 
complex policy responses than comparisons solely based on other people’s current 
consumption. While some results were possible to derive and interpret based on the most 
general setting, considerably stronger results are obtained for the somewhat more restrictive 
case where the population size, the interest rate, and the degrees of current and intertemporal 
consumption positionality are constant over time, e.g., if the economy has reached a steady 
state. The optimal tax policy is then derived in terms of the average degree of time-inclusive 
consumption positionality, which is essentially the sum of the average degree of current 
consumption positionality and the average degree of intertemporal consumption positionality. 
The tax policy also depends on differences between the mimicker and the low-ability type 
with respect to the degree of time-inclusive consumption positionality. 
 
We then show that the optimal marginal labor income tax rates become larger, ceteris 
paribus, the more positional people are on average, in terms of the average degree of time-
inclusive consumption positionality. It is also demonstrated that this modifying effect can be 
substantial. Yet, the net effects of relative consumption concerns also depend on whether the 
low-ability type is more or less positional (broadly speaking) than the mimicker. The reason 
is that this determines whether an increase in the reference consumption works to relax or 
tighten the self-selection constraint. There are no direct effects of relative consumption 
concerns on the marginal capital income tax rates; instead, positional concerns enter the 
marginal capital income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type as a scale factor, which 
is based on the degree of time-inclusive consumption positionality. We are then also able to 
generalize the well-known result of Ordover and Phelps (1979) for when there should be no 
capital income taxes, to a much more complex model where people compare their own 
current consumption with several different measures of reference consumption. Specifically, 
if, in addition to the other assumptions mentioned, leisure is weakly separable from the other 
goods in the utility function, then the marginal capital income tax rates should be zero. 
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Finally we illustrate with a Cobb-Douglas functional form and show, based on parameter 
estimates from the literature, that positional preferences of both the Keeping up with the 
Joneses and Catching up with the Joneses types substantially increase the optimal marginal 
labor income tax rates for both types. Since the leisure separability conditions are fulfilled for 
this form, the optimal marginal capital income tax rates are consequently zero for both types.   
 
We believe that the research area consisting of normative economic analysis when relative 
consumption matters is still underexplored. Examples of issues that remain to be analyzed 
include a multi-country setting, public provision of private (non-positional) goods, public 




Derivation of equations (22) and (23) 
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,, () / tt tt t t zt c Tw lw w u u =−  from equation (6) into equation (A1) and 
rearranging, we obtain equation (22). The marginal labor income tax rate of the high-ability 
type, equation (23), is derived in a similar way. 
 
Derivation of equations (24) and (25) 
Let us consider the marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type. By combining 
equations (16) and (17), we obtain 
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equation (24). Equation (25) is derived in a similar way. 
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where we have used the short notations 
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the recursive equation (A12) can more conveniently be rewritten and expanded as follows: 
(A13)           
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 .   
Substituting back [] 1 1 tt t ϕ βα + =−  into equation (A13) implies equation (26). 
 
Derivation of equation (31) 
By combining equations (22) and (30), we obtain 
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Then, by using 
1, 1 ' 1 1
, /1 ( )
t
zc t t t t MRS w T w l =−  and rearranging, we obtain equation (31) for the 
low-ability type. The corresponding tax rate for the high-ability type is derived in a similar 
way. 
 
Derivation of equation (32) 
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